L_C_I (@LCI_consult)
Per Hansen (@PerNordnet)
Finans (@Finansdk)
Michael Eis (@michael_eis)
Asbjørn Lindsø (@asbjornlindso)
Per Hansen (@PerNordnet)
Jeg er løbet lidt i forvejen, og mandag morgen er blevet til søndag eftermiddag, når det kommer til Novo Nordisk og perspektiveringen af kursstigningen rundt om lanceringen af Wegovy pillen i USA: https://t.co/2etGqwRv3E #aktier #dkbiz @NordnetDK
L_C_I (@LCI_consult)
#dkpol #dkbiz Nej, Henrik Dahl er sociolog og ikke politolog uden forstand på international politik! Derfor har Dahl også været en garant for ca 80 mia kr til Ukraine + flygtningeudgifter! Og nu er han Grønlandsforvirret - Grønland er ikke engang medlem af EU! QT @SociologenHD (Henrik Dahl) What should we call the United States we are now facing as Europeans (and therefore also as Danes)? Calling the United States an “enemy” would be too strong. Even though I fully understand the rhetorical and psychological satisfaction such a label might bring. For the time being, it is more accurate to say that the United States has developed into a strategic adversary of Europe. We see this role being played in several ways: repeated demands to take control of another state’s sovereign territory; threats to punish countries that live up to the spirit of NATO and EU solidarity; the use of tariffs and trade as instruments of pressure against allies. The next arena in which the United States may choose to test EU member states - together with the European NATO allies and Canada - is Ukraine. If the United States were to halt deliveries of missiles for Patriot systems, or to stop providing intelligence for targeting, this would constitute a further escalation - not only in Ukraine, but in the conflict with Europe and Canada. It must therefore be acknowledged plainly: the risk that the Greenland issue will be linked to support for Ukraine, or to continued American engagement in NATO, is real. The seriousness of the situation is now beginning to dawn on EU member states. This is presumably why voices are emerging that suggest rejecting the trade agreement with the United States might be a reasonable course of action. The crucial question, as always, is: What then? If you think three to five moves ahead. This is where France will send the decisive signals. France is the only EU country that truly thinks like - and is capable of acting as - a great power: with its own nuclear deterrent, its own space program, its own defense industry, and its own strategic military capabilities. But also - and this is discussed far less - with substantial territorial interests in Central and South America. For France, it would be entirely unacceptable for Greenland to set a precedent. Europe’s problem at this moment is not a failure of moral or value-based orientation. The problem is that when values are challenged, resolutions and strongly worded letters are no longer sufficient. The question therefore becomes brutally simple: can Europe impose costs on the United States that actually hurt? Can Europe credibly threaten consequences so severe that they would force Washington to reconsider its positions? I believe it can. Even the United States cannot easily absorb Europe calling in its loans, dumping dollar reserves onto the market, freezing American companies across Europe, or questioning the continued presence of U.S. military bases on European soil. What is missing, as so often, is the political will in Europe to say to the United States: This is our red line. Now we require a serious and respectful conversation about balancing our interests. Otherwise, the outcome will be worse for you than for us. We should be careful not to claim that Donald Trump is a Russian agent. That burden of proof would be difficult to lift. But it is beyond doubt that the United States is currently advancing Russian interests in several critical areas: by weakening Ukraine’s struggle for independence; by undermining NATO; and by acting in ways that deepen divisions within the European Union. Europe must come to terms with the fact that sovereignty carries a higher price than it has assumed for decades. It requires investment in military deterrence. And it may require abandoning the assumption that everything can always be produced at the lowest possible cost. Europe’s greatest risk is not that it misreads the situation. Europe’s greatest risk is to get the analysis right - and still do nothing. In international politics, actors are not judged by their intentions, but by their willingness to bear costs. The question, therefore, is no longer whether Europe can afford sovereignty. The question is whether Europe can afford to do without it.
L_C_I (@LCI_consult)
@troelslundp #dkpol #dkbiz Vi vil opfordre til at næste gang der er valgkamp i USA tænker danske regeringsmedlemmer sig om! USAs regeringer har i følge vores kilder aldrig blandet sig i dansk valgkamp! https://t.co/Ixarg6jOWh
Per Hansen (@PerNordnet)
@FlemmingJ Vi må se. Det handler mindre om realøkonomien og næste udelukkende om risikopræmien, og den kan, har vi set tidligere, bevæge sig "overraskende" - meget eller lidt! Det finder vi ud af mandag fra morgenstunden #aktier #dkbiz @NordnetDK
Per Hansen (@PerNordnet)
I tillæg til den forventede udvikling og fokus mandag morgen i Novo Nordisk, skriver jeg også om de forventede markedsreaktioner. Det er i mindre omfang realøkonomien, men mere risikopræmien og eskalationsrisikoen det handler om #aktier #dkbiz @NordnetDK
